Introduction
East Asia, the focus of the financial crisis of 1997, was a region 1 that had only recently achieved unparalleled economic development. The conventional view has held that investor attitude, along with economic fundamentals, helped to cause the collapse. Also coming in for analysis have been the mechanisms which could allow a country to suffer substantial successive damage after the crisis.
However, our analysis -which used firm-level data on the East Asian areaindicated that the outbreak of the Asian crisis was followed not only by a generally negative impact on the performance of firms, but also by expanded cross-firm variation in performance. This suggests that the effects of the Asian crisis were not necessarily uniform across the corporate sector. Another possibility to be considered is that performance may have been influenced significantly by elements peculiar to individual firms.
In this paper we focus on the corporate governance problems in a firm's idiosyncratic elements. We develop our argument around the close relationship of corporate governance problems, such as immaturity and inefficiency, to the Asian crisis.
We use firm-level data from the five East Asian crisis economies of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to study the impact of corporate governance on the performance of firms. We examine three aspects of corporate governance in particular. We will now briefly summarize our findings on how these factors affected corporate performance during the crisis.
The first aspect, ownership structure, is one of the key determinants of corporate governance. We highlight the agency problem between large shareholders and minority shareholders, and measure it in terms of the ownership concentration of controlling shareholders and the divergence between the voting rights and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders in the firm. We find that in general, these two variables are associated with significantly worse performance during the Asian crisis.
The second aspect is debt. We examine two hypotheses here -the free-cash-flow hypothesis and the debt-overhang hypothesis. We find that the debt-overhang hypothesis is supported in a very limited number of cases, and fail to detect a mechanism by which the free-cash-flow hypothesis asserts itself. Rather, higher debt is associated with significantly worse corporate performance during the Asian crisis.
This finding suggests that banks did not efficiently monitor the firms to which they lent their money, and that they tended to engage in "crony lending."
The last aspect is corporate diversification. We investigate the effects of diversification on the performance of firms and find strong evidence that diversification worked to worsen performance during the crisis, perhaps because inefficiency involving diversification surfaced at that time.
Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Theory on the Asian Financial Crisis

Traditional Theory on the Asian Financial Crisis
The causes of the Asian financial crisis of July 1997 have been analyzed mainly from the viewpoints of macroeconomics and international finance theory. These theories form the basis for several explanations, such as mid-term acceleration of external debt (from the private as well as the public sector), an aggravation tendency among economic fundamentals, and panic fund recovery by some investors 2 . The IMF is also accused of accelerating the crisis by insisting on conditionality involving major structural reform in the midst of the crisis.
The mechanism of the Asian financial crisis
Although there are several theoretical models that dealt with the mechanism of the currency crisis 3 , we focus here on the contagion model.
The characteristic feature of the Asian financial crisis is that currency collapsed simultaneously with the contraction of production. Other conditions being equal, currency depreciation will enlarge external demand; this is not, however, observed here.
The positive effect of relative price change on the demand side is offset completely by its negative effect on the supply side. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , in analyzing a dynamic economy, demonstrate that in such an economy durable assets, such as land, play a dual role. Not only are they factors of production, but they also serve as collateral for loans. The dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset prices turns out to be a powerful transmission mechanism by which the effects of shocks persist, amplify, and spill over to other sectors. The land collateral system equalizes the idiosyncratic features, such as differences in credit risk, possessed by individual firms. While it makes external financing easier for firms, the system cannot serve as an effective barrier to a macroeconomic shock that influences land prices throughout the country.
Miller and Stiglitz (1999) try to explain why the East Asian crisis worsened, using the collateralized borrowing model by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , hereafter referred to as the KM model. In their model, bankruptcy law and balance sheets play the same roles as land in the KM model. Bankruptcy law is designed to solve problems of creditor coordination in the absence of contracts. It aims to restructure credits so as to avoid premature liquidation and to divide up the assets in cases where liquidation is necessary. In normal times, bankruptcy conveys a lot of information about the quality of a firm's management and the firm's long-term viability. But in the context of a system-wide failure, little information is conveyed. The mechanisms designed to handle small, idiosyncratic shocks simply cannot cope with a macroeconomic shock of this magnitude. This is because when a large number of firms, say two-thirds of the firms in a country, are insolvent, there are no sufficient resources -human or pecuniary -to address each bankruptcy individually. Moreover, the systemic nature of the bankruptcies makes sorting out net asset positions even more difficult than in normal situations, since the assets of bankrupt firms consist of claims on other firms that are also bankrupt. A further problem is the difficulty of finding new managers or trustees to oversee all of the restructured firms. In the context of the Asian crisis, therefore, even a well-managed firm could easily go bankrupt, simply because it failed to plan for a large-scale devaluation and a substantial rise in interest rates. It thus could generate large-scale connective bankruptcy as a result 4 . Miller and Stiglitz suggest that the Asian crisis had a serious, uniform influence on corporate sectors in the countries concerned.
Is the Influence of the Asian Crisis Uniform?
In this section, we use firm-level data to investigate whether the Asian crisis had a uniformly negative influence on each country's corporate sector.
Data description
We collected financial data from the Worldscope database for all firms in Indonesia, 
The Influence of the Asian Crisis Analyzed from the Viewpoint of Corporate Governance
The Features and Problems of Family Control
In the West and Japan, ownership of big firms is comparatively dispersed. East
Asian firms, even large ones, are generally owned by one family or by a group corporation under the family's control. These families have close connections with the government and politicians, and dominate the national economy to a significant extent. When voting rights and cash flow rights diverge, the agency problem between large shareholders and minority shareholders becomes more serious. This is because when family-controlled firms suffer a loss, the family is required to pay only 18% for the loss, not 30%.
Ultimate ownership structure Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) 10 show that the widespread use of pyramidal ownership structures in East Asian firms allows insiders to exercise effective control over a company even when they own relatively few of its cash flow rights. Pyramid structures 11 and cross-shareholdings are two of the ways in which families tend to control firms. To clarify the ultimate ownership structures 12 , therefore, we have to take pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings into consideration.
Based on this view, we examine the link between ownership structure and firm performance during the crisis using firm-level data.
Survey
We discuss some relevant literature which focuses primarily on the relationship between the Asian crisis and corporate governance.
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) study country-level data and find that the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market performance decline are indeed correlated with aggregate measures of legal protection.
Mitton (2001) studies five East Asian countries at the firm level and finds evidence that during the crisis period, firms with greater disclosure performed better than other firms; corporate diversification is associated with significantly worse performance; and the separation of cash flow rights and control rights did not affect firm performance to a significant extent.
Lemmon and Lins (2001) study eight East Asian countries, also at the firm level, and find strong support for the view that firms with greater separation of cash flow rights and control rights performed worse than others.
Examination of the Hypotheses concerning the Ownership Structure
In this section, we examine whether firm-level differences in corporate governance can explain differences in corporate performance during the Asian crisis. To that purpose, we match the initial sample of firms that we described in Section 2 with ownership data from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) which contains data from the 1995/1996-time period on control rights and cash flow rights. To assess the impact of corporate governance variables on corporate performance during the crisis, we estimate the following model using the random effects method 13 :
in which the corporate governance variables included will change according to the specification, and other variables are defined as follows:
PER: performance indices (that is ROA, ROE, PMA).
CG: corporate governance variables which will be indicated afterwards according to the specification.
D95～D00：year dummies.
LTA: natural logarithm of the book value of total assets DIN: industry dummies (based on 4-digit SIC level) while t is time unit; i is individual firm cross-section unit; j is individual industry cross-section unit. Formula (1) aims at measuring how the impact of corporate governance variables on corporate performance changes over time, using total firm assets and industry dummies as control variables. We particularly want to detect changes in the parameters concerning corporate governance variables just prior to and after the Asian crisis of 1997 14 .
Concentration of ownership in firms
As we have stated, family control and concomitant high ownership concentration are predominant in East Asian firms. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that at the end of 1996, the ratio of the voting rights of the largest shareholder to total voting rights is 10% for Japan, but 35% for Thailand, 34% for Indonesia, 28% for Malaysia, 24% for the Philippines, and 18% for Korea.
The following hypothesis is drawn by the existence of controlling shareholders who have substantial control and may actually expropriate minority shareholders when conflicts of interest exist between them:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the ultimate control rights of the controlling shareholders, the more serious the agency problem between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and the more inefficient the firm's management. Therefore, these kinds of firms should exhibit larger declines in performance than others during the crisis.
We substitute the voting rights of the controlling shareholders of the firm (VR) for CG in formula (1) to investigate differences in the voting rights effect on performance before and after the crisis. This result should be interpreted as indicating that higher ownership concentration is correlated with poorer performance during the crisis period, a deterioration that lasts right up until 2000. This result is consistent with our hypothesis.
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights
The separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is another consequence of a family-controlled ownership structure. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that compared with voting rights, cash flow rights are 20% less in Indonesia, 15% less in Korea and Malaysia, 10% less in the Philippines and 6% less in Thailand.
If the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights has the potential to intensify the agency problem between controlling shareholders and other shareholders, then we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights, the greater the incentive for controlling shareholders to engage in expropriation and the more inefficient the firm's management. Therefore, firms of this sort should exhibit larger declines in performance than others during the crisis.
We substitute difference of voting rights and cash flow rights (DI) of the firm for CG in formula (1) to assess how the effect on performance of the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights will differ before and after the crisis. We eliminate firms in which there is no separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. In doing so we can assess the data set including only those firms with a divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights. Table 3 This result is not identical in all specifications and all countries. But most specifications proved that a greater separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is related with worse performance during the crisis period in countries where the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is notably large 15 .
The Role Played by Debt
In the previous section we analyzed the ownership structure effect which is the central issue regarding corporate governance in East Asian firms. But other corporate governance mechanisms exist as well. In this section we discuss the role played by debt.
Free-cash-flow hypothesis
The free-cash-flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1989 indicates that debt exerts disciplinary mechanisms on corporate management. Excess cash flow can allow managers to pursue perquisite consumption for themselves. Firms with debt, meanwhile, will manage more efficiently under the monitoring of their creditors.
East Asian firms in general are more likely to run into a certain amount of debt than to have a surplus cash flow. In fact, the average debt ratio (debt/total assets) of our sample firms at the end of 1996 was 51.3% for Indonesia, 75.0% for Korea, 44.8% for Malaysia, 39.8% for the Philippines and 57.1% for Thailand 16 .
The financial situation of East Asian firms suggests that we can expect debt to exert a disciplinary mechanism on corporate management if creditors monitor their debtors effectively.
Hypothesis 3: Firms with greater debt would manage more efficiently if creditors effectively monitor their debtors; therefore, these kinds of firms perform better than the others during the crisis period.
Debt-overhang hypothesis
Regarding the role played by debt, however, the debt-overhang hypothesis 17 suggests that firms with excessive debt have trouble attracting new investment even if they bring in a profit, because profits gained from the new investment would be appropriated first to the payment of existing debt.
Hypothesis 4: Firms with excessive debt are likely to lapse into the problem of debt-overhang, lose opportunities to make new profits, and therefore become more fragile during the crisis.
These two hypotheses are contradictory regarding the role of debt. The free-cash-flow hypothesis suggests that debt has a positive effect on firm performance.
The debt-overhang hypothesis, on the contrary, points to the negative effect of excessive debt.
We substitute one-period previous debt ratio (DA -1 ) of the firm for CG into formula
(1) to examine the relationship between debt's disciplinary mechanism and the crisis.
Then we group our sample firms into three sub samples based on the firms' debt ratio in 1996
18 . We define the firms with the lowest 20% of debt ratio as low debt ratio firms;
those with the highest 20% as high debt ratio firms. We examine the debt-overhang hypothesis by comparing the regression result of these two sub samples. We examine the debt-overhang hypotheses by comparing both the magnitude and significance of coefficients on debt ratio of low debt ratio firms (Panel B) and high debt ratio firms (Panel C). We find no significant coefficients for low debt ratio firms in specifications where dependent variables are ROA and ROE in the Philippines.
Coefficients are significantly negative for high debt ratio firms, however, and the magnitude of coefficients becomes larger after the crisis. These findings suggest that debt-overhang problems occurred in high debt ratio firms of the Philippines. We find no evidence that debt-overhang problems occurred in other countries. In other words, excessive debt has not necessarily had the negative influence on performance that the debt-overhang hypothesis suggests.
These results are contrary to the free-cash-flow hypothesis and partly consistent with the debt-overhang hypothesis. They suggest that excessive debt did not necessarily have a negative effect on performance, but rather that the funds raised by debt were used inefficiently, due to a lack of necessary skills, or a flawed monitoring system on the part of creditors, that prevented the disciplinary mechanism from working effectively. These facts might imply the moral hazard problem of crony lending -that lending by family-controlled banks went predominantly to firms controlled by the same family, that is the exposure of crony lending 20
Effects of Corporate Diversification
While it is not a direct corporate governance mechanism, corporate diversification could affect the expropriation problem and the effectiveness of corporate governance in the following ways.
First, diversified firms offer more opportunities for expropriation through misallocation of capital, such as cross-subsidization and over-investment. Second, diversification may hinder corporate governance simply because of the complexity it creates. The complexity of an organization can increase the level of asymmetric information. Expropriation may be more likely if it is more difficult to detect. Third, benefits might accrue to conglomerates, particularly in countries where capital markets are less developed. Diversification is beneficial in emerging markets, because conglomerates can perform through internal markets that allow greater access to capital needed to pursue worthwhile investments. The benefits of diversification are related to capital market development.
Benefits and costs of diversification
Whether corporate diversification benefits or harms firm valuation is a main concern in corporate theory. Chandler, Jr. (1977 , 1990 indicates that diversification is beneficial theoretically when merits exist in the profit or cost side, in economies of scope for example. Benefits might accrue to diversification to a firm particularly when the know-how of one industry can be exploited in other industries, or when a firm is a multidivisional structure part of which can be shared inside conglomerates. Lewellen (1971) also indicates that conglomerates are favorable because it saves taxes with more access to external debt whose interest payments are income deductible. Moreover, Stein (1997) suggests that conglomerates might achieve more efficient management by allocating capital efficiently through an internal capital market.
Much of the literature, however, emphasizes the negative rather than the positive effects of diversification. Berger and Ofek (1995) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) point to the inefficiency of cross-subsidization; Jensen (1986) If similar problems exist in East Asian firms, we can make the following hypothesis 22 :
Hypothesis 5: Diversified firms exhibit more inefficient management than others.
Therefore, these kinds of firms should show relatively larger declines in firm performance during the crisis.
We substitute the numbers of segments (NS) used to measure diversification levels for CG into formula (1) to investigate how the diversification effect on performance will change before and after the crisis. We also describe the average diversification levels from Worldscope information as 3.5 for Indonesia, 3.4 for Korea, 5.0 for Malaysia, 3.4
for the Philippines and 2.7 for Thailand. However the coefficients on NS around 1997 have a significantly negative effect on performance in all countries, and this negative influence lasts right up until 2000.
Overall findings should be interpreted as follows: Diversification resulted in wrongs and inefficiencies that surfaced during the crisis. This is similar to Japan's experience, where diversification advanced during the bubble period but proved a serious constraint on corporate management after the bubble collapsed.
Conclusion
Using firm-level data on East Asia, we have shown that cross-firm variation in performance expanded after the outbreak of the Asian crisis. Much of the disparities between firms can be explained by corporate governance problems among each firm's idiosyncratic elements.
Based on firm-level analysis, this paper suggests that ownership concentration enabling controlling shareholders to expropriate other shareholders; fund raising through debt that is short of effective monitoring by creditors; and inefficiency caused by the ill effects of diversification are all associated with significantly worse performance during the Asian crisis.
The region's predominant governance structure, characterized by family control and conglomerates, was considered a factor in its miraculous economic development but has been seen since the crisis as the origin of crony capitalism 23 . We find evidence consistent with this view.
Many subjects remain for further research. The first is the causality issue: Did the crisis expose corporate governance problems, or did corporate governance problems trigger the onset of the crisis? Other exogenous factors may have brought out the problems of corporate governance and the crisis. The causality is unknown in our analysis.
Second, the analysis in this paper did not encompass such country-specific institutional characteristics as corporate law, bankruptcy codes, corporate accounting standards, and corporate finance, which are important factors in regulating the rights and actions of investors and creditors.
Third, we did not provide enough analysis of the issue's political implications.
Corporate governance showed many problems deriving from a lack of transparency in corporate management, the lack of sufficiently fair and efficient financial and capital markets, and weak property rights. These institutional vulnerabilities should be checked and corrected. However little literature documents the quantitative effect of reform 24 .
Our next endeavor is to deepen the economic understanding of corporate governance in East Asia, a subject which has generated much concern in recent years.
Endnotes 1 Refer to World Bank (1993) . Regarding the reconsideration after the crisis, refer to Stiglitz, Yusuf (eds.) (2001).
2 Refer to Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and Stiglitz(2000) for the details.
crisis (the third generation model).
coefficient for 1994 and 2000.
15 Our result is consistent with that of Obata (2001), who focuses on the relationship between firm value and the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights, and presents that the negative effect of the separation on firm value is predominant during the financial crisis, although it cannot be observed in normal times. 16 The debt ratios of East Asian firms are not particularly high compared with the average debt ratio of listed firms in Japan in 1996 (72.1%) as reported by the financial data bank of the Japan Policy and Investment Bank. 17 See Myers (1977) , Myers and Majluf (1984) . 18 The average debt ratio of low debt ratio firms as well as high debt ratio firms in each country at the end of 1996 is as following:
high debt ratio firms low debt ratio firms (Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 42 (6) 56 (8) 63(9) (Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted. (Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. (Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. (Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. (Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. (Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. (Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
